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18 November 2019

Acting Justice C Simpson
Commissioner
New South Wales Law Reform Commission
GPO Box 31, SYDNEY NSW 2001, AUSTRALIA

By email: nsw-lrc@justice.nsw.gov.au

Dear Judge

SUBMISSION ON NSWLRC – CONSENT IN RELATION TO SEXUAL OFFENCES:
DRAFT PROPOSALS

Thank you for the opportunity to make a submission in response to the Commission’s Draft
Proposals (October 2019).
The Draft Proposals cover an impressive range of important issues. This submission focuses
on the draft proposal in ‘6.3 Incapacity – Intoxication’ with some brief reference to related
proposals.
Building on the foundation of research we have undertaken with others (Seear and Room),
which was discussed by Quilter in her preliminary submission (dated 29 June 2018), this
submission draws on further research on intoxication evidence in sexual assault trials that we
are currently undertaking.

1. Proposal 6: A single list of circumstances in which there is no consent
The Draft Proposals at 6 provides for a single list of circumstances in which there is no consent.
As previously submitted by Quilter in her preliminary submission there is little utility in the
current ‘may’ negate list contained in s 61HE(8) given that the Crown still has to prove there
was no consent on the occasion in question. Quilter concluded:
… at best the factors in sub-s (6) are symbolic; at worst, they may impact negatively on
the complainant and the Crown case.
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We therefore agree with shifting the factors contained in s 61HE(8) into the new proposed
single list in s 61HJ.

2.

Proposal 6.3 Incapacity – Intoxication

In her preliminary submission, Quilter identified a number of issues in relation to the current s
61HE(8)(a). These included the failure to define ‘intoxication’ and ‘substantial’ intoxication in
s 61HE(8)(a) and the fact that, in practice, ‘common knowledge’ tends to fill this gap.
Furthermore, our research raised concerns that intoxication evidence may be a ‘double-edged
sword’: it may assist the Crown to prove non-consent but may nevertheless be used by the
defence to argue that the complainant is less credible/reliable as a witness.
We accept that, as the Commission indicates, it is difficult to ‘create a test that resolves’ these
issues completely. However, we have concerns about the wording of Proposal 6.3 for at least
three reasons.
First, the proposed wording sets a very high level of intoxication: ‘so affected by alcohol or
another drug as to be incapable of consenting’. We question whether such a factor, expressed
in this way, will have utility over-and-above the primary definition of consent. Proposal 6.3
seems to simply be another way of saying that a person does not freely and voluntarily agree
to the sexual activity and hence it is unclear what further guidance fact finders receive from
this circumstance.
Secondly, the wording of proposed s 61HJ(1)(c) may overlap with at least two of the other
proposed circumstances in which there is no consent, namely, Proposal 6.2 ‘the person does
not have the capacity to consent’ and Proposal 6.4 ‘the person is asleep or unconscious’. As
the Commission notes in relation to Proposal 6.3, the phrasing ‘directs attention to the
complainant’s capacity to consent,’ which needs to be ‘so affected’ as to render the
complainant incapable of consenting. In other words, this seems to be another way of saying
that the person does not have capacity to consent (ie Proposal 6.2).
Furthermore, our current research suggests that the proposal sets such a high bar for
intoxication (‘so affected … as to be incapable’) that it brings this circumstance very close to
Proposal 6.4 (‘asleep or unconscious’). We have reviewed more than 60 Australian appeal
decisions in sexual assault matters (from 2010 to 2018) and our preliminary analysis suggests
that the cases in which the fact of the complainant’s non-consent/incapacity to consent were
those instances in which the complainant was so intoxicated that she was asleep or unconscious.
Proposal 6.3 does not provide assistance for fact finders in determining when a person is so
affected by alcohol or another drug that she is incapable of consenting to the sexual activity.
How does a jury determine when that bright line has been crossed? What is the relationship
between intoxication and capacity to consent to sexual activity? The provision provides no
guidance on these crucial questions. Our current research suggests that there is presently little
guidance in the courtroom in relation to the relationship between intoxication and cognitive
functions such as consent. To the extent that evidence is admitted about the effects of
2

intoxication it is generally in relation to capacity to perform certain physical motor functions
(such as walk, talk, text etc), or in relation to the effects of intoxication on memory. To the
extent that expert evidence about the effects of intoxication features in trials (which is rare),
such evidence tends to be related to the effects on a complainant’s memory or reliability in
recalling the events – important matters, but not illuminating on the crucial question of whether
the Crown can prove non-consent, and whether evidence of the complainant’s intoxication can
be engaged to this end. Indeed, in only one case in our current study did an expert’s evidence
even touch on consent, and the nature of that mention was that the expert ‘could not venture an
opinion as to whether that had deprived the complainant of the capacity to consent.’ 1
Overall, we are concerned that Proposal 6.3 will be a circular exercise that will not materially
assist fact finders in complex questions about the relationship between intoxication and
consent.
If there is to be an express reference in proposed s 61HJ(1) to the circumstance of complainant
intoxication – and given the available evidence of the association between sexual violence and
alcohol/other drug consumption 2 we think there should be – we recommend that the
circumstance should be worded in such a way as to give it meaning and significance,
independent of other mentioned circumstances.
In expressing reservations about the proposed new wording, we acknowledge both that the
current wording (‘substantially intoxicated’) is inadequate, and that the drafting exercise is a
challenging one Nonetheless, given the importance of the matter, we recommend that further
efforts be made to fashion an appropriate reference to intoxication in s 61HJ(1).

3. Proposal 8.3: Directions on specific misconceptions:
Draft Proposal 8.3 recommends amending the Criminal Procedure Act to include specific
directions about misconceptions of sexual assault. Sub-section 10 includes:
(10) Behaviour and appearance of complainant
Direction—
None of the following is, of itself, a reliable indicator that a person consents to a sexual
activity—
(a) the person’s clothing or appearance,
(b) the consumption by the person of alcohol or any other drug,
(c) the person’s presence in a particular location.

1

Mitic v The Queen [2011] VSCA 373 (30 November 2011), [24].
D Lievore, ‘Prosecutorial decisions in adult sexual assault cases’, Trends & Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice
No 291 (AIC, 2005); V Stern, Report By Baroness Vivien Stern CBE Of An Independent Review Into How Rape
Complaints Are Handled By Public Authorities In England And Wales (Home Office, 2010); H Flowe & J Maltby,
‘An experimental examination of alcohol consumption, alcohol expectancy, and self-blame on willingness to
report a hypothetical rape’ (2018) 44(3) Aggressive Behavior 225-234.
2
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We are supportive of attempts to break the implied nexus between intoxication and assumed
consent to sexual activity. It is not clear, however, how a direction to a jury that ‘of itself’ ‘the
consumption by the person of alcohol or any other drug’ is not a ‘reliable indicator that a person
consents to sexual activity’ will be effective. In fact, this way of framing such a direction seems
to underscore the improper process of reasoning that the proposed direction is designed to
interrupt – that is, that intoxication may well be a reliable indicator of consent.
While we accept that the Commission does not propose specific words for any such direction,
we believe it would be more useful if a proposed direction provided greater guidance. For
example, using a similar model to the warning in s 293A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986
(NSW) (differences in complainant’s account), it might be possible to add further information
about what the available evidence tells us about how intoxication can affect cognitive processes
associated with consent formation. Such a warning would appear to have a greater chance of
breaking the nexus between intoxication and consent.

Further research/evaluation required
We submit that any proposals made by the Commission should be accompanied by a general
proposal that a thorough evaluation be undertaken of any law reform that results from the
Commission’s proposal.
In the early ‘era’ of rape law reform, major evaluations of legislative amendments were
undertaken. For example, the operation of the 1981 sexual assault amendments were monitored
by BOCSAR. The findings were presented in a series of reports: BOCSAR, Crimes (Sexual
Assault) Amendment Act 1981 Monitoring and Evaluation, Interim Report No 1,
Characteristics of the Complainant, the Defendant and the Offence (1985); Interim Report No
2, Sexual Assault-Court Outcome: Acquittals, Conviction and Sentence (1985); Interim Report
No 3, Court Procedures (1987). The BOCSAR monitoring studies examined transcripts of all
rape and sexual assault offences entering committal in two separate 18-month periods. The first
period involved all charges of rape or attempted rape in the 18 months immediately before the
1981 reforms and the second period covered sexual assault categories 1-3 or attempt under the
Crimes (Sexual Assault) Amendment Act 1981 in the 18 months following the reforms.
The conclusions from the reports were used to introduce the later 1989 reforms to sexual assault
laws (by the Crimes (Amendment Act) 1989).
The effect of the various legislative reforms on the experience of complainants as witnesses in
the criminal justice process was also extensively evaluated by the NSW Department of Women
in Heroines of Fortitude: The experience of women in court as victims of sexual assault (1996).
This Report found that while legislative reforms were designed to protect complainants giving
evidence in proceedings, as the name of the Report suggests, in practice complainants were not
so protected.
However, there has not been another major evaluation of the effects of legislative change in
this area in the two decades since the Heroines of Fortitude report.
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It is submitted that the Commission should strongly recommend that there be an evaluation of
any changes made as a result of the Draft Proposals.

Yours sincerely

Dr Julia Quilter
Associate Professor
School of Law
University of Wollongong

Dr Luke McNamara
Professor and Co-Director, Centre for Crime, Law and Justice
Faculty of Law
University of New South Wales
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